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The Determinants and Trends in Public-Private Wage and
Fringe Benefit Differential
The decline in private sector wages in the aftermath of the Great Recession reopened
a longstanding debate about whether public sector employees make more than private
sector employees. However, much of this debate has only focused on the difference
in wages over the past few years. This paper uses the Current Population Survey
from 1995-2013 to examine how the federal-private wage differential has evolved over
time. Wage regressions are estimated by year for federal and private sector workers.
I then use these estimates to calculate the federal-private wage differential. This is
augmented with selectivity bias corrections for each year. Probit estimates of the
probability of receiving employer-provided health insurance and a pension plan are
also estimated for each year. The findings suggest that the federal pay differential is
invariably positive, but fell during the 1990s, began to rise in the early 2000s, and has
continued to rise to the end of the sample period. In this paper, I also examine the
difference in wage and fringe benefit between state/local government employees and
private sector employees. For the analysis, this paper uses the American Community
Survey from 2012-2014 to examine how the state/local-private wage gaps vary by
state. Probit estimates of the probability of receiving employer-sponsored health in-
surance are also estimated. The findings present a wide range of the wage differentials
between state/local government employees and private sector counterparts. On the
other hand, public employees enjoy higher probability of receiving health insurance
through a current employer.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
There is a long standing debate in economics about whether government employ-
ees receive higher wages than private sector employees. Much of this debate centers
around the wide range of estimates for wage differentials between public and pri-
vate sector employees. Recently, the Congressional Budget Office (Falk, 2012)(CBO,
2012) announced that wages were 2 percent higher for workers in the public sector
than for private sector workers with similar observable characteristics. However, if
the CBO did not control for similar observable traits, the difference between average
public and private sector wages for all workers rises from 2 percent to 9 percent. Pre-
vious research finds a much greater federal wage premium than the CBO. Another
study by the Richwine and Biggs (2011) found that the federal pay system gives the
average federal employee an hourly wage that is 22 percent more than the average
private workers’ controlling for observable skills and characteristics. This gap be-
comes even larger (30 to 40 percent) if it includes fringe benefits since the federal
pay system provides more generous healthcare and pension plans. The American
Enterprise Institute (Biggs and Richwine, 2011) reports that compared to similar
private sector employees, the federal employees are paid 14 percent more as a salary
premium. That is, private employees toil 13.7 months to earn what federal employees
do in 12. This premium gets larger, considering benefit premium, up to 44 percent.
Both institutions have released studies concluding that federal employees receive a
compensation premium over comparable private-sector workers, and that Congress
can make targeted reductions in federal compensation without harming the quality
of public services. The CBO, Heritage, and AEI studies all conclude that federal
employees enjoy a premium in combined salaries and fringe benefits over comparable
private sector employees. However, methodological differences do exist across the
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three studies, and these make very different estimations. Therefore, this dissertation
explores and examines commonly used models to estimate wage equations, both basic
model and models to account for unobservables.
Putting the theoretical assumptions aside, the main question is whether federal
workers receive more in total compensation1 than they would outside of government.
In any case, it is important to consider not only wages but fringe benefits (Rosen,
1987). Further, the analysis of fringe benefit differentials needs to also take into ac-
count employee characteristics because fringe benefits are a form of compensations
similar to wages and salaries. Thus, in this paper, I examine the wage and fringe
benefit differential between private and federal sectors in the U.S. using the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) and CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS
MORG) from 1995 to 2013. When analyzing fringe benefits, the outcomes analyzed
are the probabilities that the private sector and federal sector workers receive health
insurance and retirement pension benefits2 from their employers. I find that there
are substantial changes in this differential during the last two decades. However,
the federal wage premium, during the sample period, is always positive. The gap
becomes narrower by the end of the 1990s and gets wider in the early 2000s. Con-
trolling for observable and unobservable characteristics that affect workers’ wages is
a crucial factor. Therefore, I augmented with methods to deal with the unobserv-
ables. The findings indicate that ”ability” is not unidimensional, but rather federal
and private sector wages are best analyzed as a Roy model (Roy, 1951; Heckman
and Honore, 1990). In Roy model, workers self-select the sector that gives them the
highest expected earnings. Equilibrium in each market equates supply and demand,
while a self-selection condition means that the marginal worker is indifferent between
the two sectors. The Heckman-Lee3 selectivity bias approach is therefore preferable
1Total compensations include wage and fringe benefits.
2This includes defined benefit and defined contributions plan such as Thrift Saving Plan (TSP)
for federal workers and 401(k) for private sector workers.
3Lee, Lung-Fei, Lee (1978)
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to instrument variable (IV) or fixed effect (FE).
Federal deficits motivated looking at federal pay. A companion analysis would be
to examine state/local government pay. Though previous work does not show as large
differentials as with federal workers, examining state/local is still worthwhile. Also,
the state/local wage differential varies across states and it makes sense to understand
this variation. In this paper, I also examine the wage and fringe benefits differential
between state and local government employees and private sector employees in the
U.S. using the American Community Survey (ACS) between 2012 and 2014. For the
analysis of the fringe benefit differential, the outcome variables are the probability of
receiving employer-sponsored health insurance, indices for state government pension
generosity4, and state pension underfunding status. I find that wage differentials
of state and local government employees to private sector employees vary by states.
There are states with positive wage premium (e.g. Massachusetts, New York), neg-
ative wage premium (e.g. Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky), and statistically no wage
premium (e.g. Alaska, Michigan, Rhode Island) for state government workers. In
addition, the wage premium for local government employees also varies by states,
from some with positive premium (e.g. California, Maryland, Ohio) , some with neg-
ative premium (e.g. Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas) and some with statistically no
wage premium (e.g. Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire). Using estimates of the state-
private and the local-private wage differential, I examine how these vary depending
on the level of government intervention, degree of business friendliness, and economic
performance ranking.
Various studies have used different data and estimating methods in reaching a
wide range of conclusions regarding wage differentials between state/local and pri-
vate sector employees. For example, Bender and Heywood (Bender and Heywood)
find that state government workers earned an average 11.4 percent less than private
4Annual benefit , Total retirement income replacement rate for full-career state government
retiree.
3
sector workers of similar tenure and education and local government employees earn
11.6 percent less. The Center for State and Local Government Excellence (SLGE,
2011) reported its research findings with the Boston College research team5 that state
and local employees have a wage penalty of 9.5 percent without considering pension
contributions and 4 percent wage penalty after considering pension contributions.
Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute and Joydeep Roy of Columbia
University and New York City’s Independent Budget Office argued that any pay
differentials should be considered in light of differences in working conditions. In
reference to the public school teachers’ example, they said, “A more balanced assess-
ment would consider other dimensions of teacher working conditions: the hierarchical
nature of the job, the inflexible work hours, the relative inflexibility of vacation plan-
ning, the frequently unsafe working conditions, the lack of private office space, and
the stress of being ”on stage” nearly all day in front of students.”
In contrast, according to recent Employer Costs for Employee Compensation sur-
vey from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of December 2015 (BLS, 2016), state
and local government workers earned total hourly compensation of nearly 40 percent
higher than private sector employees. This difference includes over 24 percent higher
wages and salaries and over 55 percent greater total benefits. However, this does not
control for individual worker characteristics.
The main question for these findings is whether state and local government workers
are overcompensated or undercompensated, regarding wage and fringe benefits, rela-
tive to comparable private sector employees. In either case, overpaid or underpaid, it
is essential to estimate these differentials, not only wage but also fringe benefits such
as health insurance and retirement benefits because the latter are important aspects
of compensation. Further, the analysis of fringe benefit differentials needs to take
into account of employee characteristics because pensions are a form of compensation
5Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubury, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quinby
4
similar to wages and salaries (Bewerunge et al., 2012).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: in chapter 2, I discuss the past
literature examining the public and private wage differentials in section 1. In ad-
dition, I scrutinize Federal rules on compensation such as retention pay. Section 2
describes the main dataset, the CPS MORG and March CPS, and presents sum-
mary statistics for the main variables. Section 3 presents the models that I use to
estimate federal-private wage differentials and fringe benefit differentials. The han-
dling of the unobservables is outlined in here. This section reviews and compares
existing methods for controlling unobservable characteristics. Three methods that
are considered in this section are a Heckman model, IV, and FE. Based on the anal-
ysis of heterogeneity from the error term, I will test which model is most suitable
to use in estimating wage differentials. The test mainly focuses on the dimension of
unobservable characteristics. That is, whether it is one dimensional unobservables
such as ”ability” or multi-dimensional ones so I also need to consider comparative
advantage across sections. Chapter 3 presents the wage differentials from OLS wage
equations and Heckman model in section 1. Probit estimtes of the probability of
receiving employer-provided health insurance and a pension plan are also presented.
Additionally, I examine the determinants of the time path of the federal-private wage
differential using national-level political and economic indices. Nineteen wage differ-
entials from each year are used as a time series. This shows the factors that make
changes to wage gap. Section 2 concludes. In chapter 4, I review the previous litera-
ture examining state-local and private wage gaps in first section. Section 2 explains
and describes the main dataset, the ACS, and presents the descriptive statistics for
the key variables. Section 3 presents the estimation of wage differentials from the
OLS wage equations. The analyses of benefit differentials are outlined in Section 4.
In Section 5, I examine the effects of exogenous variables regarding the state policy
environment such as government intervention in state economics, economic perfor-
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mance ranking, and others as well as variables that represent economic condition for
each state such as state-level unemployment rate, mean salary, etc. on the estima-
tion of wage and fringe benefit differentials. Lastly, Section 6 concludes. At last, I
summarize overall findings in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2 Federal-Private Wage and Fringe Benefit
Differentials
2.1 Previous Literature
Wage differentials between public and private sector employees has been well doc-
umented starting with Smith’s seminal series of papers (Smith, 1975, 1976; Bailey,
1977). Smith (1975) found that in 1960, federal workers were paid more than compa-
rable private sector workers and that in 1970 they still enjoyed that advantage. This
difference implied that the reforms made in the federal pay system was conceived and
implemented in error. She also found that the wage differentials relative to the pri-
vate sector were significant for federal and local government workers, but that of the
state government workers was statistically insignificant (1976). This finding showed
that the level of government - federal, state, or local- matters when estimating wage
differentials between the private and public sector. In 1990, there was deeper research
conducted both between and within these sectors. Katz and Krueger (1991) argued
that in the 1980s there was a sharp rise in the skill differentials within the private
sector. However, that sharp increase did not occur equivalently in the public sector.
Education differentials, which are highly correlated with skill differentials, and overall
wage inequality barely increased in the federal government sector, and increased only
moderately in the state and local government sectors Autor et al. (2008). In addition,
their examination of regional pay variation indicates that wages in state and local
governments respond substantially to changes in local economic conditions. These
papers concluded that the approximately 2.1 million non-postal federal employees
received a positive wage differential of 10 percent - 35 percent that can be interpreted
as an economic rent. However, Moulton (1990) reexamined the federal-private wage
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differential using data from 1974-1979 and found that the federal-private wage differ-
ential appears to have narrowed considerably. In addition, he discovered that after
accounting for detailed occupational and locational characteristics of the federal work
force and including sampling weights, the federal wage premium was 4-6 percentage
points smaller than previously thought. He obtained a point estimate for the wage
differential of 3.1 percent using national data. Further, with respect to administrative
and professional occupations in the high-wage, urban areas, the estimated gaps are
smaller, near zero, or slightly negative.
Borjas (2002) investigated the changes in wage gap due to the changing in wage
structure. His evidence suggests that the public sector worker in high-skilled groups,
or who does quite well within a particular skill group, will increasingly want to quit
the public sector and enter the private sector under the circumstance of the relative
compression of wages in the public sector. Thus, over time, the public sector should
find it increasingly more difficult to attract high-skill workers from their current
private sector positions, and retain high-skill workers. His previous research finds that
there exists the racial and sexual wage differentials among similar skilled workers and
these statistics are related to characteristics of the agency’s constituency (Borjas,
1980, 1982, 2005). Donahue (2008) presents extensive evidences to show that the
wage distribution of private and public sector employees diverges at the lower and
upper bottom of the wages. The entry-level jobs in government tend to be paid more,
with better security and benefits, than those of private sector. In the higher wage
ranges, private sector earnings exceed those in government by substantial margins.
He observes that public sector employees stay closer together in their earnings, with
the lower-paid workers pulled up toward middle-class and higher-paid workers pulled
downward toward middle-class status. More recent research about public-private
sector wage differentials includes Bewerunge et al. (2012) who used the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). They found that federal workers earned a wage premium
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of about 17.2 percent, taking differences in employee characteristics into account.
There are three institutions that conduct recent research about federal wage
premium- CBO, the Heritage Foundation, and AEI. All studies conclude that federal
employees enjoy their premium of wage and fringe benefits. However, methodological
differences do exist across the studies, CBO finds a much smaller wage differential
compare to Heritage and AEI. Sherk (2010) finds that federal wage premium is 22
percent and premium that combined wages and benefits for federal employees’ is ap-
proximately 30 to 40 percent more than comparable private sector employees. The
average private-sector employees’ annual fringe benefits are $9,882, while the federal
government pays $32,115, on average, to the workers. Biggs and Richwine (2011)
also find that comparing to private sector workers, the federal government pays their
workers 14 percent salary premium, 67 percent benefit premium. Thus the total
compensation from wage and benefits is approximately 44 percent. The CBO (2012)
reports that it would have found a 2 percent average wage premium. The reason of
this discrepancy is that AEI and the CBO control for firm size while Heritage does
not. For example, estimate of the CBO rises to 9 percent if it does not control for
firm size. There is not a clear reason why larger business offer higher wages and
benefits than smaller ones, some research suggest that higher pay at large firms could
represent a compensating differential for aspect of large businesses that employees
dislike, such as bureaucracy and ired tape (Biggs et al., 2012). Based on this, federal
government employees should have wage premium compare to private sector employ-
ees since federal government is one of the largest employer in the U.S.. However
this explanation about wages still remains state-local government employees wage
unexplained. The CBO and AEI also find that the differential is depending on edu-
cation level of employees. They find that the most educated federal employees have
the smallest salary premium. The CBO reports that workers whose highest level of
education was no more than a high school, a bachelor’s degree, and a professional
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degrees or doctorate earned 21 percent more, roughly the same, and 23 percent less,
on average, than private sector counterparts. Similarly, AEI studies shows federal
workers with only a high school education are paid over 22 percent more than com-
parable counterparts, while graduate degree holders make only 3.9 percent more than
private sector workers, on average.
The investigations about the public-private wage differentials have been active in
many other countries. Several studies in European Union (EU) countries find pay
differentials in favor of the public sector that are generally higher for women, for
workers at the low end of the wage distribution, and in the Education and the Public
Administration sectors rather than the Health sector. Notable differences emerged
across EU countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibited higher
public sector premia than other countries (Bargain and Melly, 2008; Giordano et al.,
2011; De Castro et al., 2013; Bargain and Melly, 2008; Blackaby et al., 2012; Van der
Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988).
There are a host of studies have examined whether state and local workers are
overcompensated relative to their private sector counterparts. So far, researchers have
no real disagreement about state-local workers as a group are not paid more than their
private sector counterparts. The controversy arises on the benefit 1 side. The question
whether the value of the benefits provided to state-local workers offsets the wage
penalty (Munnell et al., 2011). Several researchers conclude that the benefits do not
totally offset the wage penalty based on Employer Costs for Employee Compensation
(ECEC) from Bureau of Labor Statistics (see for example Allegretto (2015)). The
response by one set of critics is that the ECEC survey understates state and local
employee compensation in three ways: 1) Contributions to defined benefit pensions
and to 401(K) plans are not comparable. Public sector pension plans guarantee
1Compensations include paid leave, such as vacation, holiday or sick pay; supplemental bonus
pay, such as bonuses and overtime; insurance, such as life and health coverage; retirement and
savings, such as employer contributions to defined benefit and defined contribution plans; and legally
required benefits, such as Social Security and Medicare.
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participants a return of 8 percent, while 401(K) plans do not guarantee such high rate.
2) It omits retiree health since employers generally do not prefund these plans and
therefore do not make payments for active employees. In addition, covered employees
can buy retiree health insurance at group rather than individual rates, which raises the
value of these benefits above the employer’s normal cost. 3) Public sector workers have
much greater job security than their private sector counterparts, and this advantage
has a baseline value of 6 percent (Biggs and Richwine, 2011). Biggs and Richwine
conclude that proper accounting for retiree health, defined benefit pension, and job
security raise the premium to 30 percent. In recent years, there has been significant
workers interest in job security. This increased interest has been driven at least in part
by the state of the economy since the recession began in 2007. The argument is that
job security, like wages and other benefits, is a major goal of collective bargaining.
During this recession, employment in the state-local sector is down 3.1 percent since
its peak, compared to 5.6 percent in the private sector. Rosen and Bewerunge also
find that pension wealth accumulation is greater for employees in all three government
sectors than for private sector workers, even after taking worker characteristics into
account. On the other hand, they find no evidence that highly educated individuals
are penalized by taking jobs in the public sector, either with respect to wages or
pension wealth in their 2012 research.
2.1.1 Federal Rules on Compensation
In the competitive labor market, the private sector and federal government are po-
tential competitors as employers. Therefore the federal government tries to recruit or
retain well-qualified employees using both its basic pay system and its special rate2.
To compare wages between public and private sector workers, it is essential to un-
2Special rate is higher rate of basic pay for a group or category of General Schedule(GS) positions
in one or more geographic areas to address existing or likely significant handicaps in recruiting or
retaining well-qualified employees.
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derstand how federal rules are set for their employees and how competitive they are
compared to the private sectors. According to U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), the federal pay system can roughly be divided into two sections. One is the
basic rules for government-wide employees. The basic pay rules are also divided into
two parts, General Schedule (GS) and Federal Wage System (FWS). The GS clas-
sification and pay system covers majority of the approximately 1.5 million civilian
white-collar federal employees in professional, technical, administrative, and clerical
positions. The GS has 15 grades from GS-1 (lowest) to GS-15 (highest). Each grade
is classified by job based on the responsibility, level of difficulty, and qualifications
required. Each grade has 10 within grade steps that are each worth approximately a 3
percent increase in the wage. The FWS was established for Federal blue-collar work-
ers comparable to prevailing private sector rates in each local wage area. The FWS
covers for Federal trade, craft, and laboring employees. There are two basic princi-
ples for FWS: 1) wages are set according to local prevailing rate, and 2) there will
be equal pay for equal work and pay distinctions in keeping with work distinctions.
For each wage area, OPM identifies a lead agency. The lead agency is responsible
for conducting wage surveys, analyzing data, and issuing wage schedule under the
two principals above. Employees are paid the full prevailing rate at step 2 in each
grade. The highest step in FWS, step 5, the wage of employees is 12 percent above
the prevailing rate of pay.
The OPM establishes a higher rate of basic pay for a group or category of GS
positions in one or more geographic areas to address existing or likely significant
handicaps, due to low wage, in recruiting or retaining well-qualified employees. The
special rates address staffing problems caused by significantly higher non-federal pay
rates than those payable by the federal government within the area, location, or occu-
pational group involved. This includes the remoteness of the area or location involved,
the undesirability of the working conditions or nature of the working involved, or any
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other circumstances OPM considers appropriate. Most of GS employees are entitled
to locality pay, which is a geographic-based percentage rate that reflects pay levels for
non-federal workers in certain geographic areas as determined by surveys conducted
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). There are currently 34 locality pay ar-
eas, which cover the lower 48 States and Washington D.C., plus Alaska, Hawaii, and
the U.S. territories and possessions. For compensating extraordinarily difficult living
conditions and undesirable working condition, the federal government pays both a
cost-of living allowance (COLA) and a post differential. A post differential means an
addition to basic pay that is payable in selected non-foreign areas. A post differential
is a recruitment incentive based on conditions of the environment in the non-foreign
area that differ significantly from conditions in the U.S. as a whole. However, post
differentials plus the COLA cannot exceed 25 percent of basic pay. These rules are
incorporated into the examination of federal pay relative to private pay.
2.2 Data
The primary data source is the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rota-
tion Group (CPS MORG) from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
between 1995 and 2013. In recent years, each monthly CPS has included about
140,000 individuals living in approximately 70,000 households. Upon selection into
the CPS ORG sample, household members are surveyed in four consecutive months,
not surveyed for the subsequent eight months, and then interviewed for four more
consecutive months. The ORG questions concern the respondent’s periodicity of pay,
hourly wage, usual weeks worked per year at that rate, usual hours worked a week,
and overtime pay. These work and income questions differ from March CPS variables
because the March CPS questions use a reference period of the last week or last year,
not current pay or usual hours. Matching current individual characteristics with the
current income and work responses are sometimes more proper than matching cur-
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rent characteristics with last year’s pay and work conditions. One another advantage
from using MORG data instead of March CPS is that I can have more observations
and more balanced data. Because MORG data covers all months, not only March,
the information from it will be more balanced.
Table 3.1 summarizes the mean wages of private workers and public sector workers
from 1995 to 2013. Wage information does not contain annual bonuses which likely
affects private sector more than public sector. Since many previous studies indicated
that there were different wage trends among public sector workers, federal, state, and
local government workers are presented separately. The focus of this paper, however,
is the federal-private differential. Figure 3.1 shows the unadjusted ratio over time.
The ratio of average federal to average private sector employees’ wages has been
fallen, and then increased over time for full time workers with age between 18 and 70.
The wage ratio for state-local government workers has been declining over the period
as expected. However, average wages for state and local government workers, with
similar education level and worker’s characteristics, are equal or higher than those in
private sector. Since these trends occur before controlling for many other factors, it
is necessary to reexamine the trends after controlling for those factors to get more
accurate results.
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 shows comparison for health insurance and pension plan
benefits using March CPS data. The compensation is more generous in the federal
sector. Comparing the probability of receiving employer sponsored fringe benefits, on
average, the federal employees have enjoyed 11 percent higher for health insurance and
30.4 percent higher for pension plan than private sector employees, on average. That
is, 80 percent of private sector employees receive employment based health insurance
from their current employer, in comparison to 91 percent of federal employees. The
retiree pension plans are much more prevalent for federal employees than in the
private sector. An estimated 50.7 percent of private sector workers have retirement
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plans coverage. On the other hand, the federal government workers have 81.1 percent
coverage.
Table 3.3 gives the summary statistics of variables that are included in this re-
search. All wages in the data are expressed in 2012 dollars value using the CPI. In
the sample, 4 percent of individuals were working in the federal government and had
20.8 years of experience on average. Slightly less than half of the entire sample’s
labor force was female and 9.8 percent of workers in this sample answer that they
have union membership and 74 percent of interviewees are white. Among ten major
occupations, the federal government employees are working mainly in management,
professional, service, and administrative occupations. Mostly these four occupations
are white-collar jobs. I also control 34 locality areas carefully in this dissertation
which is one of contribution in the literature. The federal government offers 34 dif-
ferent wage schedules which are dependent on the location. Most of areas off the
general wage schedule are metropolitan areas. Due to the higher cost of living in
metropolitan areas, private sector workers receive higher wages. Thus, these vari-
ables help to control for wage differences due to cost of living. The higher proportion
of federal government workers stays in these metropolitan areas by 7 percent. Table
3.4 summarizes mean values of key variables from the CPS MORG data for both
sector workers. There are a couple of common trends across sectors, federal govern-
ment and private sector. First, the average year of education attained is increasing.
Across both sectors, the average education level increased the most in the federal
government- from 14 years in 1995 to 15.04 years in 2013. Second, the overall age in
both sectors increased over the period. The aging workforce can be explained by the
Post- World War II Baby Boom Generation. It created an unusually large birth co-
hort for the U.S. population, resulting in a large aging population today. Differences
do exist, however, among these sectors. For example, the average education level
for federal employee is higher than for private sectors workers. The federal workers
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attained 1.3 more years of education relative to their private sector counterparts.
2.3 Models
This section presents models that are used to estimate the federal-private wage dif-
ferential. I employ two models to find the wage differential, the basic OLS wage
equations and the Heckman model. With the OLS model, I estimate separate two
equations, year-by-year; one for federal workers only, one for all private sector workers
from 1995 to 2013. The equations that I used to estimate the OLS models are below.
Here, dummy variable dit equals 1 if the worker is employed in the federal sector and
0 otherwise:
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + β
f
itXit + 
f
it if dit = 1, where t = 1995, · · · , 2013 (2.1.1)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + β
p
itXit + 
p
it if dit = 0, where t = 1995, · · · , 2013 (2.1.2)
The Yit is hourly wage
3 for workers. The term Xit is a vector of individual char-
acteristics and demographics such as gender, union, race, MSA, region, occupation4,
and locality. The it is the disturbance term. After obtaining estimated coefficients,
the predicted wage differential is computed, using sample means. Below are brief
explanations of the variables used in the model:
In addition, I narrow the sample to full-time workers only; thus, I dropped the
workers who worked less than 35 hours per week. I use the workers whose age range
is between 18 and 70 years.
3The wage rate is used, if reported. Otherwise, this is reported earnings divided by reported
usual hours over that time span.
4 1) Management, business, and financial 2) Professional 3) Service 4) Sales 5) Office and admin-
istrative support 6) Farming, fishing, and forestry 7) Construction and extraction 8) Installation,
maintenance, and repair 9) Production 10) Transportation and material moving
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The OLS model assumes that the ‘Public’ variable is uncorrelated with distur-
bance term, implying that sectoral differences in unobserved characteristics do not
affect the estimated wage differential. However, if they are correlated, due to some
unobservable characteristic such as ability, then the estimations from the OLS model
are biased (Olsen, 1980). Thus in here, I relax this assumption.
Let
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + β
f
itXit + φi + θ
f
i + 
f
it if dit = 1 (2.2)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + β
p
itXit + φi + θ
p
i + 
p
it if dit = 0 (2.3)
where φi is absolute advantage for both federal and private employee such as ’ability’
and it is white noise for each sectors. If a worker has unobservable absolute advantage
in working, he/she can earn higher wage in both sectors. The terms θfi and θ
p
i reflect
comparative advantages in sectors for each. For example, a person can be well-suited
to government work and not for the private sector, implying a large θfi and low θ
p
i .
Naturally, other cases are possible. If θfi = θ
p
i , then this collapses to the absolute
advantage case with only φi. These equations can be re-written as
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + β
f
itXit + it1 if dit = 1 (2.4)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + β
p
itXit + it0 if dit = 0 (2.5)
where it1 = φi + θ
f
i + 
f
it and it0 = φi + θ
p
i + 
p
it . The standard way to deal
with two dimensional unobservables is using Heckman-Lee method. Other methods
such as IV and FE model deal only with uni-dimensional ability. As shown below,
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using Heckman-Lee, I can test whether the unobservable ability is uni-dimensional
or two-dimensional. To do so, I start with standard Heckman-Lee assumptions of
joint normality. The probability of a workers choosing federal depends on the wage
differential s/he earns and exogenous factors such as the ease finding federal relative
to private jobs. Let the latter factor be represented by the vector Zi which includes
state-level unemployment rate, employment growth rate, and the ratio of federal
employees to overall employees in each state. Then the probability of dit = 1, being
federal government employees, is :
Pr(di = 1) = Xiδ + Ziγ + αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui (2.6)
This equation can be written as
di = Viψ + 2 (2.7)
di =

1 if 2 > −Viψ
0 if 2 ≤ −Viψ
where 2 = αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui and Vi = f(Xi, Zi). Since equation (2.6) estimate
probability of being federal government employee, I can assume that τ is positive.
That is, a person who has comparative advantage for federal government work should
have θfi > θ
p
i and is more likely to be federal worker. Whether the use of the Heckman-
Lee model is appropriate or not depends on the findings.
The expectation of disturbance term for federal government worker and private
sector worker, separately, from equation (2.2) and (2.3) are
E(1|fedi = 1) = E(1|2 > −Viψ) = σ12
σ2
[
f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ] (2.8)
E(0|fedi = 0) = E(0|2 ≤ −Viψ) = σ02
σ2
[
−f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ] (2.9)
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where σ12 is the covariance of 1 and 2 and σ02 is the covariance of 0 and 2. f is
standard normal density function and F is cumulative normal density function.
From (2.8)
σ12 = Cov(1, 2)
= Cov(φi + θ
f
i + 
f
i , αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui)
= ασ2φ + τ(σ
2
f − σfp)
(2.10)
From (2.9)
σ02 = Cov(0, 2)
= Cov(φi + θ
p
i + 
p
i , αφi + τ(θ
f
i − θpi ) + ui)
= ασ2φ + τ(σfp − σ2p)
(2.11)
where σfp is covariance between θ
f
i and θ
p
i , σ
2
f and σ
2
p are variance of θ
f
i and θ
p
i ,
respectively.
If there exists only absolute advantage, φi 6≡ 0 and θfi ≡ θpi ≡ 0 , then from
equation (2.10) and (2.11) :
σ12 = ασ
2
φ (2.12)
σ02 = ασ
2
φ (2.13)
in this case, I can estimate wage differential between two sector employees using any
models that allows us to control unobservables since I have uni-dimensional unob-
servables. Combined equation (2.7), (2.12), and (2.13), if higher ability employees
are more likely to be federal government worker (α > 0), then σ02= σ12 > 0. On
the contrary to this, if higher ability employees are more likely to be private sector
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worker (α < 0), then σ02= σ12 < 0.
If there exist both absolute advantage and comparative advantages, φi 6≡ 0 and
θfi 6≡ 0 6≡ θpi , then it will back to equation (2.10 ) and (2.11). Note that depending
on the size of each variance and covariance, σ12 and σ02 can be either sign.
Notice if φi ≡ 0 and σfp = 0 then the coefficient σ12 > 0 and σ02 < 0.
The nature of the cross-equation correlation is readily tested with the Heckman-
Lee methodology. To estimate wage equation using Heckman-Lee model, I use probit
model the same as equation (7) and wage equations in (4) for federal employees and
(5) for private employees. I include in the vector Zi variables intended to capture
the relative availability of federal in the workers’ location. They are worker’s states’
unemployment rate, real GDP growth rate, employment growth rate, and the ratio
of federal government workers to all employees. Using probit estimations and wage
equations, I can have wage equations as:
ln(Y fit ) = β
f
0t + β
f
itXit +
σ12
σ2
[
f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ] + ν1 if dit = 1 (2.14)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + β
p
itXit +
σ02
σ2
[
−f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ] + ν0 if dit = 0 (2.15)
where σ12
σ2
[ f(Viψ)
1−F (Viψ) ] is inverse Mills ratio and ν1 and ν0 are white noise. According
to Garen (1987), the error terms from each wage equation can be varying depending
on the value of federal dummy. This can be proved by comparing coefficients of
inverse Mills ratio from Heckman model. Equation (1) can be generalized to allow
the coefficient and error term to vary depending on the value of Public dummy. Then
combining equation (14) and (15) using di will be
ln(Yit) = υ1Xit+υ2Xitdi+ϕ0(1−di)[ −f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ]+ϕ1(1−di)[
f(Viψ)
1− F (Viψ) ]+µ2 (2.16)
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where ϕ0 = (σ02 / σ2) and ϕ1 = (σ12 / σ2). Using ψˆ instead of ψ and estimating (16)
by OLS is consistent. This approach allows the cross-equation correlation between
error terms to differ depending on the value of federal dummy variable so that ϕ0 6=
ϕ1. That is, comparing the coefficients of inverse Mills ratio will give evidence that
unobservable characteristics include only absolute advantage in working for either
sector or in addition to the absolute advantage, the comparative advantage also exists
in it.
Fringe benefits, such as retirement pensions and health insurance, may be a critical
factor in compensation. Thus, it is essential step to compare fringe benefits in addition
to wages between sectors. For the analysis of the fringe benefit differential between
federal and private sector employees, I use two benefits: employer-provided health
insurance and retirement pension plan. To analyze the binary choice of whether or
not employers offer health insurance and pension plans to their employees I use a
probit model, where
P (Yit = 1) = Φ(X
′
itρ)
i indexes the individual, and t indexes time. In this estimation, Yit is the health
insurance provision status of workers or the retirement pension plan offer status from
their current employer, Φ(·) is the distribution function for the standard normal.
The vector of observable characteristics Xit is the same as in the OLS model. I run
separate probit equations by year for health insurance and pension plan.
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Chapter 3 Findings
3.1 Results
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5 summarize the estimated wage gap between two sector
workers. Calculating wage differentials, year by year, using two separate equations
from each sector, I find that federal government workers have been received between
4.16 percent and 17.14 percent more than their counterparts in private sector. These
findings suggest that the federal pay differential is invariably positive, but fell during
the 1990s, began to rise in the early 2000s, and has continued to rise to the end of
the sample period.
Additional OLS wage regressions are estimated by year and separately for federal
and private sector workers with only four occupations which dominates federal em-
ployment. According to OPM, they are mostly white-collar workers. Table 3.6 and
Figure 3.6 indicate the federal wage gap for only four occupations workers from 1995
to 2013. Overall trend of differentials are quite similar to the previous case, however,
these federal wage premia are more stable and higher, with a minimum of 8.8 percent
and maximum of 16.91 percent, than that all occupation workers.
These findings are based on OLS wage equations which assume no correlation
between sectoral choice and unobservable characteristics in disturbance term. Since,
however, sometimes this is strong assumption, I use Heckman model to relax this
assumption by dealing with two-dimensional unobservables. Followings are results
after controlling the unobservable characteristics.
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show the summary of coefficients write out from Heckit
procedure in case of all occupations and only four occupations, respectively. With all
occupations, the coefficients for private sector are consistently positive, however, the
coefficients for public sector workers are relatively unstable and volatile compared to
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private sector coefficients. Based on the test statistics, I conclude that the coefficients
are not same. This implies that comparative advantage matters. Except couple years,
they are statistically different from each other. With a sample of only four occupation
employees, a fewer number of sample years shows that the coefficients write out from
Heckit procedure are statistically different. But still there exists years with different
coefficients, such as 1999, 2000 and so on. I also experimented similar correlation tests
with other functional forms, such as linear probability model and logit model, but
the nature of the finding was the same. In addition to correlation test, I conducted
sensitivity test to find robust evidences for existing comparative advantage in error
term from wage equations. For this analysis, I estimate a probability of being federal
employee with probit, logit, and LPM. With estimated probabilities from each model,
I calculate residuals, and then plug this into the wage equations to compare the sign
of coefficients. At first, I test with linear residual term and find statistically significant
positive coefficient of public sector and negative coefficient of private sector in the
wage equation for all three residual terms. I also find same signs of coefficients
from the second test, with linear term and square term of residuals, and the third
test, with linear, square, and cubic term of residuals. That is, all three models
that estimate probability of being federal government employees have residuals with
similar distribution. Thus, the comparative advantage matters not only in probit
model, which is used in Heckit model, but also in other models. In sum, the IV
approach and the FE model can only deal with uni-dimensional ability. However
results from Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 show the evidence that there exist 2-dimensional
ability. Because the assumption about uni-dimensional unobservables is violated
with data during sample periods, they are inappropriate to use for estimating the
wage differential. Therefore, this paper uses Heckman-Lee model to calculate wage
differentials.
Table 3.9 and 3.10 indicate the summary of federal wage gap to comparable private
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sector workers, year by year, from 1995 to 2013 utilizing Heckman model. From Table
3.9 and Figure 3.7, the federal government employees’ wage premium comparing to
private sector workers is at least 4.76 percent and it increases up to 17.25 percent,
after controlling detailed demographics and characteristics, including locality. This
means that federal pay gap is invariably positive during sample period. The wage
differential has evolved from the 1990s to 2013. In the 1990s, the wage premium for
federal government employees decreased gradually, however, it began to rise in the
early 2000s, and has continued to rise to the end of the sample period. Table 3.10
and Figure 3.8 describe the summary of the wage differential between federal and
private only the four selected occupations. The lowest federal wage premium is 8.95
percent in 2003 and maximum premium is, in 2013, 17.23 percent. The path of the
wage differential for these occupations is slightly different from all occupations. The
wage premium with all occupations began to increase at the beginning of the 2000s,
but the pay gap with only the four occupation employees decreased until 2003. The
wage gap was higher in the 90’s but fell, then rising in the 2000s. I also estimated
federal-private wage differential using different exogenous factors such as real GDP
growth rate, the ratio of federal spending to state GDP, and so on. However, the
estimation is very close to what I have in here. To test whether these differentials are
statistically different, I utilize 95% confidence interval. Comparing 95% confidence
interval, I find that they are not statistically same. For example, upper limit of wage
differential in 1999 is 10.44 percent. This is less than lower limit of wage differential
from 1995 and estimates after 2006. This result is similar to estimates using only 4
selected occupation workers. The upper limit is 11.3 percent in 2003. However, this
value is lower than the value of lower limit from 1995, 1997, and all years after 2006.
For the deeper analysis, I utilize decomposition method in wage differentials from
Heckman model. I used to decompose the difference in a distributional statistics be-
tween two sectors into five explanatory factors: education, gender, race (black), union
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membership status, and locality. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.2 show the time trend of
five differences that are calculated as (βf - βp) for education, gender, race (black),
union membership status. Estimates of locality is calculated as sum of (βf - βp) *
Xi, year by year. I cannot find similar pattern of the overall wage differential from
these estimates. I also examine correlation test between the differences from those
five explanatory variables and wage differential estimates from Heckman model. The
correlation test results are summarized in Table 3.13. Correlation coefficients also
indicate that differences in coefficients between federal and private sector wage equa-
tions do not help explain the time pattern of the overall differential. Another approach
utilizing decomposition method is examining effect from average value difference be-
tween federal and private employees. Table 3.12 and Figure 3.3 present the time trend
of estimates from (X¯f - X¯p) * βp. To examine the similarity of pattern between over-
all wage differentials and these differences, I conduct correlation test and results are
shown in Table 3.14. Correlation test indicates that education level, union member
status, and locality variables are highly correlated with wage differentials from both
all occupations and four selected occupations. The wage differential estimation from
all occupation employees is relatively more correlated than that comes from four se-
lected occupations. Education level and locality measures are positively correlated
with wage differentials and union member status is negatively related. That is, as
employees are better educated and more likely to live in one of 34 locations, which
federal government offers special rate for their employees, the wage gap between two
sector employees increases. On the contrary to this, as higher proportion of employees
become union members, wage differential decreases. This trend helps to explain the
time pattern of the overall wage differential. As I already indicated, proportion of
union member out of entire employees is decreasing faster in private sector compare
to federal government employees and wage differential has been increased since early
2000s. Therefore, I find evidence, using decomposition method, that education level,
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union member status, and locality measures help explain the time pattern of the
overall wage differential.
In addition, Figure 3.9 shows that wage premium with only the four occupations is
relatively higher until 2002 and fluctuated less during the sample period. Even though
there are some differences in patterns of federal pay gap, in general, the paths of wage
differentials are similar. Furthermore, the analogous pattern was observed from OLS
estimation. Therefore it is worthwhile to compare the pattern with and without
controlling for unobservable characteristics. Figure 3.10 shows the estimated federal
wage premium from both OLS and Heckman model. The wage gap from Heckman
model is at most 0.8 percent larger and is at minimum 0.55 percent smaller than that
from OLS. Even though they do not exactly match each other, the gap between two
estimations is less than 1 percent during overall period. Thus, I can conclude that
Heckman model estimates are preferred, but the magnitude of selection problem is
not very large. People have speculated one both sides of this; that private sector gets
better workers and others say the public sector gets better workers. My results show
that it is not just an ability difference, but a comparative advantage. And of small
magnitude. Figure 3.11 summarizes the comparison of four occupations workers only.
The finding and the conclusions are very similar to all workers.
The two main components of the fringe benefits are health insurance and retire-
ment pension plans that are providing from a current employer. Using probit model,
I estimate probability differential of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance
and retirement pension plans.
Table 3.15 shows the marginal effects of the fringe benefit differential between
federal and private sector workers. Federal government workers enjoy much higher
probability of receiving an employer-provided retirement pension. It decreased until
the early 2000s, but it rose beyond the period so that federal workers have an over
20 percent greater likelihood of being covered. Figure 10 shows the trend of pension
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plan differentials. Magnitudes are high and all differentials are statistically significant.
The second column in Table 3.15 is for employer-sponsored health insurance. The
results for health insurance are less dramatic than for pensions. As seen in Figure
11, magnitudes are lower and not all sample periods show statistically significant
differentials. Most recently, since year 2010, the estimations are at least marginally
significant.
I find from previous results that wage differentials vary by years. Therefore, I
investigate the reasons why they are so different across years. For the analysis of
the determinants for the wage differentials, I examine the relationship between the
yearly estimated wage differentials1 and national-level data for economic and political
variables. Variables used to explain the variation in the federal-private wage differ-
ential are the unemployment rate of workers between 25 and 54, federal spending
to GDP ratio, and the President during sample period. Table 3.16 summarizes re-
gression results of two specifications. They are regressed with the same explanatory
variables on different wage differentials. In specification 1, I examine the economics
condition effects on wage differentials. Specification 1 shows the effect of economic
condition variables on wage differentials for all employees and four selected occupa-
tions employees separately. Regardless of occupation, federal spending to GDP ratio
increases wage differential, however, the effect of unemployment rate is statistically
insignificant. For all workers, 1 additional percent federal spending to GDP will in-
crease wage differential 2.4 percent, on average. For four selected occupation workers,
the effect of increasing federal spending to GDP smaller than all workers’ as much as
0.5 percent. The federal spending usually increase when economic condition is bad
and the private sector workers wage growth relatively small during economic condi-
tion is bad. However, public sector worker’s wage increases by GS or FWS, that is,
less depending on economic condition. Therefore, the wage gap could be larger when
1These are from Heckman model
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the period of federal spending increases.
In specification 2, I add president variables to test the effect of each president
on wage differential during sample period and to check how the effect of economic
variables will change. Two equations with all employees and four selected occupa-
tions employees show similar estimate for federal spending to GDP ratio on wage
differential to without controlling president. However, controlling for the president,
the unemployment rate becomes statistically significant. Unemployment rate nega-
tively related with wage differentials from both equation in specification 2. That is,
one additional percent in unemployment rate will derive 2.8 and 2.4 percent drop
in wage differential for all occupation employees and four selected occupation em-
ployees, respectively. This finding is interesting since additional control over political
variable, actually makes effect of economic variable more significant. In addition,
dummy variable for President Bush increased wage differential 3.3 percent relative
to the presidential term of Clinton. Although it is not statistically significant, wage
differential is getting wider as presidents changed from President Clinton to President
Bush and from President Bush to President Obama. In addition to these variables, I
test with extra state-level variables such as real GDP growth rate, and employment
growth rate. However, the results are similar.
3.2 Conclusion
The recent serious economic conditions in the U.S. provoked debates about public
sector worker pay. The main concern about these arguments is whether public sector
workers earn the same wage or not. There is much research about wage differential
between the public and private sectors, however, most of them have examined only
the wage, and none have examined the time trend. This paper does both. Further, I
pay careful attention to the potential bias from unobservables.
The OLS estimation for federal wage premium with all workers is between 4.16
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percent and 17.14 percent. For the four selected occupations that I examine, the
estimates range between 8.8 percent and 16.91 percent. I also explore three general
methods, fixed effects (FE) model, IV approach and the Heckit model, to control
for unobservable characteristics that might cause biased OLS estimations. Since FE
model and IV approach only control for one dimensional unobservable, such as ability,
Heckman selection correction model is used in this research due to its ability to control
two dimensional unobservables as in a Roy model. The estimation of wage differential
from Heckman model is between 4.76 percent and 17.25 percent for all employees and
between 8.95 percent and 17.23 percent for the four occupations. These findings
suggest that the federal pay differential is invariably positive, but fell during the
1990s, began to rise in the early 2000s, and has continued to rise to the end of the
sample period. Potential reason for this differential comes from the different incentive
in the private sector and the public sector. Private firms go bankrupt if they overpay,
however public sector does not. The latter is more influenced by political factors and
less so by economics factors. It gives less pressure for the public sector to minimize
cost.
The probability of receiving fringe benefits, employer-provided health insurance
and a pension plan, are also estimated. Federal employees enjoy much higher prob-
ability of receiving employer-provided pensions. It decreased until the early 2000s,
but it rose beyond the period to above 20 percent more than private sector workers’
probability. Probit estimates of the probability of receiving employer-provided health
insurance shows a smaller magnitude than pensions and not all sample periods show
statistically significant differentials. However, since 2010, the effect is marginally sig-
nificant. The federal government employees gradually have a higher probability of
receiving employer-sponsored health insurance than their counterparts of up to 8.45
percent.
Finally, I examine the factors that affect the wage differential over time. Among
29
economic and political indices, the real GDP growth rate is negative and the employ-
ment growth rate and federal spending to GDP ratio are positively related to the
wage gaps.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Real Average Hourly Earnings, by Worker Category, 1995-2013 CPS
MORG.
Data are from the Census Bureau .
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Table 3.2: Percentage of workers receiving fringe benefit
Data are from the Census Bureau .
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics, 1995-2013 Current Population Survey Merged Out-
going Rotation
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.5: Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 1995-2013 CPS MORG
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.6: Wage Differential, OLS, Year-by-Year, 4 Occupations, 1995-2013 CPS
MORG
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.7: Coefficients of inverse Mills ratio, Year-by-Year, Each Sector
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.8: Coefficients of inverse Mills ratio, Year-by-Year, Each Sector, 4 Occupa-
tions
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.9: Wage Differential using Heckman Selection Model, Year-by-Year, CPS
ORG
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.10: Wage Differential using Heckman Selection Model, Year-by-Year, 4 Oc-
cupation, CPS ORG
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 3.11: Summary of Coefficient Differences for Key Independent Variables
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Table 3.12: Summary of Mean Value Differences for Key Independent Variables
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Table 3.15: Fringe Benefit Differential from Probit model
Note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Trend of Real Wage Ratio between Public and Private Sector.
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50
Figure 3.4: Percentage of workers receiving fringe benefit
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Figure 3.12: Trend of Pension Plan Differentials, Year-by-Year, March CPS
Figure 3.13: Trend of Health Insurance Differentials, Year-by-Year, March CPS
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Definitions for Variables
• Hourly Wage: The wage rate is used, if reported. Otherwise, this is reported
earning divided by reported usual hours over that time span.
• School: This variable indicates the number of years of education the workers
attained.
• Experience: I calculated potential experience (= Age- School -6).
• Female: If a worker who interviewed is female, then the value for this variable
is 1 and 0.
• Race: There are four race dummy variables one each for White, Black, Asian,
others.
• Region: There are four region dummy variables, one each Northeast, Midwest,
South, and West.
• MSA: This variable defines the Metropolitan Statistical Area status. Separate
dummies are created in the city of an MSA, the balance of the MSA, and
non-metropolitan location.
• Occupation: Dummies variables are created for ten major occupations.
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Chapter 4 State.Local-Private Wage and Fringe Benefit
Differential: Effect of the State Policy Environment
4.1 Previous Literature
For the last four decades, there has been much research on wage differentials be-
tween public and private employees. Discussion of wage differentials between these
two sectors started in the 1970s (Smith, 1976a, 1976b, 1977). Smith (1976a) found
that federal employees received higher wages than their private sector counterparts
and in early 1970s, they still enjoyed that advantage. This wage premium for public
sector workers implied that the reforms made in the public pay system was conceived
and implemented in error. She didn’t find the wage differential between state/local
government employees and private sector employees. Smith’s second paper (1976b)
discovered a significant difference from private sector employees not only for federal
employees, but also local government employees, but still didn’t have sufficient ev-
idence to find conclude that the state government employees’ wage is significantly
different from private sector employees . These findings suggested that different level
of public sector should be dealt differently in estimating wage differentials between
the public and private sectors. In 1990’s, Katz and Krueger (1991) argued that during
the 1980s, skill differential, which is highly related to education differential, played
an important role in wage inequality between the public and private sector employ-
ees. Sharp increasing in the skill differential for both state and local government
moderately increase the wage inequality. In addition, their examination of regional
pay variation indicates that wages in state and local governments respond substan-
tially to changes in local economic conditions. In the state and local government
sector, pay compression occurred but reflected improvements in wages for less edu-
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cated workers relative to the private sector, rather than sharp declines in the wages
of highly educated workers. Borjas (2002) investigated the changes in wage gap due
to the changing wage structure. His evidence suggests that public sector workers in
high-skilled groups are more likely to quit the public sector and enter the private
sector under the circumstance of the relative compression of wages in the public sec-
tor. Thus, over time, the public sector should find it increasingly difficult to attract
high-skill workers from private sector positions, and retain high-skill workers.
There is research that estimates a positive total compensation premium for state
and/or local government employees. Recent research about public-private sector wage
differentials includes Rosen and Bewerunge (2012). They found that there exist no
statistically wage differential between state and local government workers and their
private sector counterparts. However, pension wealth1 accumulations for state and
local government employees are greater than private sector employees. Taking pension
wealth into account, the compensation benefit for state government and for local
government employees is 8.3 percent and 8.6 percent higher, respectively. According
to the most recent Employer Cost for Employee Compensation survey (BLS, 2015),
state and local government employees received total hourly compensation of $44.97,
compared to $33.58 for private workers, which is nearly 40 percent higher. This
difference includes over 24 percent higher wages and salaries (state and local: $28.63,
private: $23.06) and over 55 percent greater total benefits (state and local: $16.35,
private: $10.52). However, this does not control for worker characteristics.
In contrast, there also exist papers and reports that estimate a wage penalty for
state and/or local government employees. Researchers found that greater fringe ben-
efits for state and local government employees do not totally offset the wage penalty
using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Employer Costs for Employee Compensation
(ECEC) survey (Allegretto and Keefe, 2010). Lewis and Galloway (2011) analyzed
1Defined contribution plans
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and estimated wage differentials using Census and American Community Survey data.
They combined state and local government employees and compared to their private
sector counterparts. They concluded that most state and local governments pay less
than private firms. However, they present a wide range of differentials with minimum
of -15.2 percent in Kansas and with maximum 13 percent in Nevada. There were 41
states with a statistically significant wage premium for state and local government
employees and 5 states with a statistically significant wage penalty.
Regarding public sector pay, Edwards (2010) found that most of public sector pay
advantage comes from fringe benefits using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
data. They concluded that average compensation in the state/local government and
private sectors moved at a similar pace between 1950 and about 1980. However after
1980, public sector compensation growth began to outpace private sector growth.
In 2008, average compensation from benefits for public sector employees is $15,761
but only $9,881 for the average private sector employees. Biggs and Richwine (Biggs
et al., 2014), regarding state worker wages, found that wages in nearly all states2
fall below those paid in the private sector, but fringe benefits, health insurance and
retirement benefit, are significantly greater for public sector employees. In sum, state
government employees in most states3 receive greater total compensation, with an
average total compensation premium of 10 percent.
Overall, researchers find no systematic differences between state-local workers and
private workers’ wages. However, they acquire more fringe benefits4, which may or
may not.
249 out of 50 states except Connecticut
342 out of 50 states except Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Dakota,
Virginia, and West Virginia
4Compensations include paid leave, such as vacation, holiday or sick pay; supplemental bonus
pay, such as bonuses and overtime; insurance, such as life and health coverage; retirement and
savings, such as employer contributions to defined benefit and defined contribution plans; and legally
required benefits, such as Social Security and Medicare.
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4.2 Data
In this research, the primary data source is the American Community Survey (ACS)5
from U.S. Census Bureau between 2012 and 2014. The ACS data is the largest house-
hold survey in the United States, with a sample size of about 3 million housing unit
addresses throughout the country. The ACS collects detailed demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and housing information. Regarding fringe benefits, the ACS contains data for
employer health insurance provision. I use this variable for part of the fringe benefit
differential analysis, in conjunction with a separate analysis for pension benefits with
other data.
Table 4.1 summarizes the mean wages of private workers and public sector work-
ers from 2012 to 2014. Federal, state, and local government workers are presented
separately. The primary focus of this paper, however, is the wage differential be-
tween private and state/local government employees. The ratio of average state to
average private sector employees’ wages is consistently below 1, which means state
government workers earn less during the sample period. The ratio of local to private
employees is very close to one.
Table 4.2 shows probability of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance.
Over this period, 90.6 percent of state and 90.2 percent of local government employees
received employer-sponsored health insurance. However, only 75.8 percent of workers
in the private sector had health insurance through a current employer. One of the
main components of fringe benefits is employer pension coverage. However, due to
lack of data on retirement pension benefits from the ACS, I examine pensions with
different data6.
Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics for the pooled ACS data by sector. In
the sample, 5.4 percent and 8.8 percent of interviewees work for state and local
5Data is collected from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
6Data are collected from Biggs et al. (2014) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009)
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government. On average, public sector workers are older and better educated than
private sector employees. A higher percentage of the state and local government
employees are female and black. With regard to occupation, a higher proportion
of public sector employees are working in professional occupations than the private
sector.
4.3 Basic OLS Wage Equations
I use OLS wage equations to estimate wage differentials for the state-private and
local-private workers. I estimate three separate pooled wage equations, state-by-
state: one for state workers, one for local government employees, and one for private
sector employees from 2012 to 2014. One specification controls for major occupations
and the other does not. Here, the class of worker variable dit equals 1 if the worker is
employed in state government, 2 for local government, and 0 for the private sector.
The wage equations are given by:
ln(Y sit) = β
s
0t + β
s
itXit + 
s
it if dit = 1, where t = Alabama, · · · ,Wyoming
(4.1.1)
ln(Y lit) = β
l
0t + β
l
itXit + 
l
it if dit = 2, where t = Alabama, · · · ,Wyoming
(4.1.2)
ln(Y pit ) = β
p
0t + β
p
itXit + 
p
it if dit = 0, where t = Alabama, · · · ,Wyoming
(4.1.3)
The variable Yit is average earnings. The term Xit is a vector of individual char-
acteristics and demographics including gender, educational attainment, experience,
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race, metropolitan statistical area, and occupation7, and it is the disturbance term.
After obtaining estimated coefficients, the predicted wage differential is computed,
using sample means. For this research, I narrowed the sample to full time workers8,
excluding military workers and self-employed workers. I use the workers whose age
range is between 18 and 70 years. Thus, I estimate a state-private and local-private
wage differential for each state.
Table 4.4 summarizes estimates of the wage gap regarding both state-private and
local-private. With wage equations that control for occupations, the wage differential
between state employees and the private sector ranges from -32.4 percent (Wyoming)
to 18.63 percent (North Dakota). Overall, I find that state government employees
earn, on average, 7.5 percent less than private sector counterparts. Eighty percent
of states pay lower wages for state employees compared to private counterparts. The
estimation of wage differentials between local and private employees also has a wide
range. It is between -20.64 percent (Mississippi) and 21.43 percent (Idaho). Overall,
the local government employees pay 1.1 percent less than private sector employees.
Fewer states have a wage penalty for local government employees compared to state
employees. Fifty-eight percent of states have wage penalty for local government
employees. There are three states where both state and local government employees
have statistically significant wage premium compared to private sector employees:
Florida (state: 5 percent, local: 7 percent), New Jersey (state: 13.4 percent, local:
7.1 percent), and New York (state: 14 percent, local: 13.1 percent). On the other
hand, there are nine states with wage penalty for both state and local employees:
examples are Georgia (state: -15.5 percent, local: -9.3 percent), Kentucky (state:
-31.3 percent, local: -9.8 percent), and Mississippi (state: -8.7 percent, local: -20.6
percent)9.
7Detailed definition of characteristics/demographics are in the appendix.
8Working equal or more than 35 hours per week.
9The other states are North Carolina (state: -20.1 percent, local: -8.1 percent), Ohio (state: -4.8
percent, local: -7.1 percent), Texas (state: -12.5 percent, local: -10.5 percent), Utah (state: -15.2
66
Table 4.5 presents estimated wage differentials from OLS wage equations without
controls for occupation. State workers in North Dakota have the greatest wage pre-
mium of 19.4 percent and those in Nebraska have the highest wage penalty of 40.75
percent. The estimation of the wage differential between local and private employees
also has wide range. It is between -25.6 percent (South Dakota) and 21.9 percent
(Idaho). On average, state government employees received 7.8 percent less and lo-
cal government employees received 2.8 percent less than comparable private sector
employees. There are two states where both state and local government employees
have statistically significant wage premium compare to private sector employees: New
York (state: 14.5 percent, local: 12.3 percent) and Pennsylvania (state: 3.1 percent,
local: 2.7 percent). On the contrary, there are thirteen states with wage penalty for
both state and local employees: examples are Illinois (state: -5.4 percent, local: -2.2
percent), and Kansas (state: -9 percent, local: -8.4 percent)10.
Table 4.6 presents the correlation matrix among these four differentials. There are
no significant correlations between the state-private and local-private wage differential
estimates. However, the state-private wage differential estimates are highly correlated
as are the two local-private wage differential estimates.
4.4 Fringe Benefit Analysis
Previous analysis shows that state and local government workers’ compensation in-
cludes more fringe benefits. Thus, it is an essential step to compare fringe benefits, in
addition to wages, between sectors regarding the total compensation comparison since
percent, local: -16.2 percent), Virginia (state: -20.2 percent, local: -4.1 percent), West Virginia
(state: -14 percent, local: -8.4 percent).
10The others are Georgia (state: -18.7 percent, local: -17.3 percent), Kentucky (state: -36.8
percent, local: -11 percent), Louisiana (state: -18.7 percent, local: -17.3 percent), Missouri (state:
-9.6 percent, local: -2.8 percent), New Mexico (state: -18.4 percent, local: -14.6 percent), North
Carolina (state: -21.1 percent, local: -11.5 percent), Oklahoma (state: -26.3 percent, local: -22.6
percent), Texas (state: -16.2 percent, local: -14 percent), Utah (state: -16.3 percent, local: -14.8
percent), Virginia (state: -17.8 percent, local: -11.2 percent), West Virginia (state: -10.4 percent,
local: -12.3 percent).
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they are a critical factor in worker’s compensation. For the analysis of the fringe ben-
efit differential, I estimate the probability differential of receiving employer-sponsored
health insurance between public and private sector employees. Since ACS does not
have information about employer pension coverage, I use different data for the anal-
ysis of employees’ retirement pension. To estimate the health coverage probability, I
use the following probit model,
P (Yit = 1) = Φ(X
′
itρ)
where t indexes states, and i indexes the individual. In this estimation, Yit is a
binary variable to indicate whether persons have health insurance through a current
employer and Φ(·) is the distribution function for the standard normal. The vector
of observable characteristics, Xit, is the same as in the wage equation. I ran separate
probit equations by state to estimate the probability differential.
Table 4.7 shows the marginal effects of the probability of the employer-sponsored
health insurance differential between public and private sector workers. Positive val-
ues mean that public sector employees have a higher probability of receiving health
insurance through a current employer. I find that in all 50 states, state government
workers have a significantly higher probability of receiving employer-sponsored health
insurance. This higher probability ranges between 4.3 percent (Utah) and 19.6 per-
cent (Idaho), with an average of 11 percent. This fringe benefit differential between
local and private sector employees is similar to that between the state and private
sectors. Except for Alaska, local government employees have a higher probability of
receiving health insurance through a current employer. Idaho also has the greatest
differential at 19.8 percent and the smallest differential is found in Hawaii as 3.4
percent. The average local-private differential is about 11 percent as well.
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4.5 Determinants of Wage and Fringe Benefit Differentials
In this section, I examine the relationship between the wage and fringe benefits differ-
entials and state-level data for economic and political variables. I find from previous
sections that wage and benefit differentials vary by states, with, wage differentials
having an especially wide range. Therefore, I investigate the reasons why they are so
different across states.
4.5.1 Determinants of the Wage Differential
In section 4, I estimate four wage differentials between public and private sector
employees. I have the state-private wage differential with and without controlling for
workers’ occupations. In addition to that I estimate the local-private wage differential
with and without controlling for workers’ occupations. These differentials vary widely
across states. Thus, I investigate the reasons for this variation. For the analysis, I
utilized the following models:
WD
SPj
t = α
SPj
0t + α
SPj
1t Xt + µ
SPj
t , where j = 0, 1 (4.2)
WD
LPj
t = α
LPj
0t + α
LPj
1t Xt + µ
LPj
t , where j = 0, 1 (4.3)
The WDt is wage differentials from state t. The t indicates 50 states and j has
two possible values. If j = 0, estimates are from the model which with no occupation
controls and if j = 1, estimates of the wage differentials are those with occupation in
the wage equations. Wage differentials between state government and private sector
employees are marked with SP and those between local and private sector workers
are marked separately as LP . Variables used to explain the variation in the wage
differentials, Xt, are state-level variables for unemployment rate, the mean wage,
the percentage of each state’s employees who are union members, the state govern-
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ment policy environment, and demographic information. To measure the effect of
the state policy environment, I use three indices11. They are the Freedom in the
50 state’s index (Mercatus Center, 2011), Best States for Business (Forbes, 2014),
and Economic Performance Ranking (ALEC, 2014). The Mercatus index provides a
comprehensive ranking of states on their public policies that affect individual free-
doms in the economic, social, and personal spheres. They obtain the overall freedom
index by summing personal, social, and economic freedom indices12. Forbes annually
announces its ranking for the best states for business. The annual ranking measures
six vital categories13 for each state and combines the ranks in these six main cate-
gories to obtain the overall rank. Lastly, ALEC Economic Performance Ranking is
a backward-looking measure based on the state’s GDP, absolute domestic migration
and non-farm payroll employment growth rate. These are highly influenced by state
policy. Table 4.8 is correlation matrix among these rankings. The Forbes ranking
and the ALEC ranking are not well correlated with other rankings. The Mercatus
overall ranking is highly correlated with other Mercatus rankings. That is, it makes
sense because the other Mercatus rankings are the components of overall ranking.
Table 4.9 shows the summary of results using the state-private wage differential
as the dependent variable. The difference among specifications (1) through (4) uses
different rankings as measure of the government policy environment in each state.
When the dependent variable in a regression is based on estimates, I need to consider
sampling error before estimating. Sampling error occurs when there is difference
between the true value of dependent variable and its estimated value. Thus I adjusted
and find the robust standard error using bootstrap method. In specifications (1) and
(2), I use the Mercatus rankings and in (3) and (4), I use Forbes and ALEC rankings,
11I use rankings, that is , 1 through 50.
12The categories are Fiscal Policy Ranking, Regulatory Policy Ranking, Economic Freedom Rank-
ing, and Personal Freedom Ranking
13They are Business Cost, Labor Supply, Regulatory Environment, Current Economic Climate,
Growth Prospects and Quality of Life.
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respectively. Specifications (1) and (2) show that the Mercatus overall ranking and
component rankings are not statistically significant. From specification (4), the ALEC
ranks also do not have significant explanatory power regarding the state-local wage
gap. However the Forbes ranking is statistically significant. This result implies that
as the ranking increases by one, which means a worsening business environment,
the state-private wage differential increases 0.35 percent, ceteris paribus. Table 4.10
presents the results of estimating the same regression model but using the wage
differential estimates that controls for workers’ major occupations. The results are
very similar to Table 4.9. I find that the Forbes ranking is statistically significant,
but the rankings from Mercatus and ALEC are not. From specification (3) in Table
4.10, I can conclude that, holding all else constant, as the Forbes ranking increases
by one, the state-private wage gap widens by 0.32 percent. Table 4.11 and Table
4.12 present a similar analysis for the local-private wage differentials. In the analysis
of local-private wage differential, there are no statistically significant effects of the
rankings. However, in specification (4), the unemployment rate matters for the local-
private wage gap. As a state’s unemployment rate increases 1 percent, the wage gap
increases by 0.2 percent.
In sum, among rankings that I use to measure the government policy environment,
the Forbes ranking has a significant effect. States that are a better place for business
have a smaller state-private wage differential. However none of the rankings have a
significant effect on the local-private wage differential.
One may wonder, why the different rankings have dissimilar effects. Perhaps, this
is not that surprising since the rankings are not highly correlated. It seems that
they are measuring different aspects of the state environment. The Forbes ranking,
for example, is much more influenced by private business climate components, such
as labor supply and business cost, relative to the ALEC and Mercatus rankings.
Evidently, this better explains the state-private wage differential.
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4.5.2 Determinants of the Fringe Benefit Differential
Health insurance and retirement pensions are two main components of fringe benefits.
In this section, I test for the effect of the state policy environment on fringe bene-
fits. For the analysis of health insurance, I use the estimated probability differential
of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance between public and private sector
employees. In addition to health insurance analysis, I test for the effect of the state
policy environment on retirement pension coverage. However, retirement pension re-
lated data are not available from ACS. Thus I look for other state-based data on
pensions to capture its generosity. I use data about annual benefits for new retirees
and total retirement income replacement rates for state employees to investigate the
effect of the state policy environment on the pension differential. Also, I estimate the
policy environment’s effect on how well-funded the state’s pension system is.
Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 present OLS regression estimates for the state-private
and the local-private probability differential of receiving health insurance through a
current employer. From table 4.13, I find no evidences that measures of the policy en-
vironment affect the state-private differential. Instead, the aggregate schooling level
in the state matters for all three specifications. Increasing the percentage of high
school degree holders decreases the fringe benefit differential between state govern-
ment and private sector employees by about 0.7 percent. Regarding the local-private
differential, these results are shown in Table 4.14. The ALEC ranking has a negative
effect on this differential. As the ALEC economic performance ranking decreases,
indicating a higher rank, the probability differential of receiving health insurance
becomes wider. Other than the ALEC index, the percentage of high school degree
holders in each state decreases the fringe benefit differential between local and private
sector employees through health insurance by about 0.7 percent.
Since I do not have ACS data on pension benefits, I turn to other sources for this.
Data on state government employees’ pension benefit is available from Biggs (2014).
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The variables I use are the annual benefits for new retirees and the replacement rate
paid to a full-career state employee. Table 4.15 shows the summary of data that I
collect for analyzing retirement pension benefit. These are estimated using salary
data and benefit formulas available in pensions’ annual actuarial valuations. The
average replacement paid to a full career employee is 87 percent of final earnings and
the average annual benefits is $ 37,060. Table 4.16 and 4.17 report the results of
regressions to explain variations in these variables. Regarding the finding for annual
pension benefit in Table 4.16, the Mercatus and Forbes ranking are not significant.
Likewise, for the retirement income replacement ratio shown in Table 4.17. In con-
trast, the ALEC ranking has a statistically significant effect on total annual pension
benefit. As the ALEC ranking increases by one, indicating a worse ranking, the an-
nual pension amount decreases by $ 343.56 on average. In addition to the rankings,
the unemployment rate and the percent of black population have significant effects
on the retirement pension variables. The states with higher unemployment rates or
a higher proportion of blacks pay less of an annual pension benefit to their state
government employees.
Lastly, I examine the ratio of state’s pension underfunding as percent of tax rev-
enues and the effect of the state policy environment on it. Most state governments
offer defined benefit pension plans to their employees. These plans contrast with de-
fined contribution plans which are prevalent among private sector employees, such as
401(k) plans. State government employees, under defined benefit plans, are guaran-
teed future payment when they retire. To fund this, states manage their own pension
funds. The security of this guarantee may depend on how well states fund these plans.
A poor funded plan may detract from the value of the pension benefit. I collect data
on pension funding from Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009). Summary of this data is in
Table 4.15. In this data, Ohio has the largest burden as a percent of total annual tax
revenues (874 % underfunded) and Vermont has the smallest (171 %). The average
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rate of overall states is 435 %.
Using a market-based discount rate, the present value of the already-promised
pension liabilities amount is $ 5.17 trillion, with a net of $ 1.94 trillion is in state
assets. Thus, these pensions are underfunded by $ 3.23 trillion. If state governments
do not have sufficient funds when a worker retires, then the states will have to increase
taxes or cut spending which can affect all workers in states. Table 4.19 presents the
OLS regression estimates for the ratio of state’s pension underfunding as percent
of tax revenues. From specification (3), I find that the ALEC ranking matters in
predicting this ratio. The coefficient for the ALEC ranking, 0.04736 indicates that
as a state has worse ranking by one, the additional liability to the state-sponsored
pension plan is 4.73 percent of annual tax revenue higher. That is, states with better
standing in the ALEC ranking are in a better condition regarding funding their state
employees.
In addition to checking the effect of the state policy environment on wage and
fringe benefit differentials, I examine how they are different between states with
’Right-to work law’ and ones without it. According to the national right to work
committee, the right to work law secures the right of employees to decide for them-
selves whether or not to join or financially support a union. However, employees who
work in the railway or airplane industries are not protected by the law, and employees
who work a federal enclave may not be. The OLS test results show that there are no
statistically significant differences between states that pass the law and ones does not
on wage and health insurance differentials. However, ’Right to Work law’ has signif-
icant effect on the ratio of state’s pension underfunding as percent of tax revenues
among retirement pension related variables. Table ?? presents the OLS regression
estimates for the ratio of state’s pension underfunding as percent of tax revenues.
The coefficient for ’Right to Work law’ indicates that the states with this law have
184.6 % lower annual tax revenue amount of liability to state-sponsored pension plan.
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This implies that states with ’Right to Work law’ have better condition in funding
for their state retirees.
4.6 Conclusion
Though previous work on state and local government worker pay does not show as
large differential as with federal workers, examining state-private and local-private
wage differentials is still worthwhile. Overall, there is general agreement that state-
local workers as a group are not paid more than their private sector counterparts in
salary. The argument arises on the fringe benefit side. Therefore, it is important to
examine wage and fringe benefit differentials as well. Also, the wage and benefit vary
across states, I estimate these differentials, state-by-state, comparing worker’s hourly
wage and probability of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance. In addition
to health insurance, I collect the data related to retirement pensions to investigate
more details about the fringe benefit side.
The OLS estimations for state-private and local-private wage differentials show
that they range widely. Estimated wage differentials between state government and
private sector employees are between -32.4 percent (Wyoming) and 18.63 percent
(North Dakota) in one of my specifications. In another, the state-private wage gap
ranges from -40.75 percent (Nebraska) to 19.4 percent (North Dakota). I also in-
vestigate wage differentials between local government employees and their private
sector counterparts. State workers in Idaho enjoy the highest wage premium of 21.43
percent by one specification and 21.9 percent by another. In contrast, Mississippi is
the state that has the highest wage penalty for local government employees of -20.64
percent by the first specification, and South Dakota has the biggest wage penalty
at -25.6 percent with the second specification. Overall, local government employees
received 2.8 percent and state government employees received 7.8 percent less than
comparable private sector employees.
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To investigate the fringe benefit differential, I estimate the probability of receiving
employer-provided health insurance in each sector and calculate the differences. I
find that, both state and local government employees have a significantly higher
probability of receiving health insurance through a current employer in all states. On
average, state governments are 10.9 percent more likely and local governments 11.2
percent more likely to provide health insurance than the private sector.
Using the wage and fringe benefit differentials estimates, I investigate the deter-
minants of the differential with state-level data for the economic policy environment
by state. As indices for this, I obtain rankings from Forbes, ALEC, and the Mer-
catus Center. These indices rank states on their state policy. The Forbes ranking
is the only index that explains variation in state-private wage differentials. As the
Forbes ranking increases the state-private wage gap widens by 0.32 percent. None of
the policy environment indices, however, are statistically significant in predicting the
local-private wage differential.
Regarding the determinants of fringe benefit differentials, I use the estimates
of the probability differential of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance and
data on retirement pensions. The ALEC ranking has a negative and significant effect
on fringe benefit differential between local and private employees. As the ALEC
economic performance ranking decreases, implying a worse ranking, the probability
differential of receiving health insurance through a current employer becomes smaller.
Finally, I examine the factors that affect state government retirement pension
generosity and the degree of soundness in funding state employees’ retirement pen-
sions. Among the policy environment indices, the ALEC ranking is related to the
total amount of annual pension benefit and the ratio of state’s pension underfunding
as a percent of tax revenues. As the ALEC ranking increases by one, implying a worse
rankings, annual pension amount decreases by $ 343.56 and 4.73 percent of annual
tax revenue amount is added as an additional liability to state-sponsored pension
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plan. Additionally, there exists difference in underfunding ratio between states with
and without ’Right to Work law’. The states with the law has better standing in
funding for their state government retirees.
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Table 4.1: Real Average Hourly Earnings, by Worker Category, 2012-2014 ACS.
Data are from the Census Bureau.
Table 4.2: Percentage of workers receiving Health Insurance.
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics, 2012-2014 American Community Survey
Data are from the Census Bureau.
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Table 4.4: Wage Differential (with occupation), OLS, State-by-State, ACS
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Table 4.5: Wage Differential (pooled occupation), OLS, State-by-State, ACS
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Table 4.7: Health Insurance Probability Differential
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Table 4.9: OLS regression for the State-Private WD (Pooled Occ.) on Policy Envi-
ronment Rankings
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Table 4.10: OLS regression for the State-Private WD (with Occ.) on Policy Environ-
ment Rankings
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Table 4.11: OLS regression for the Local-Private WD (Pooled Occ.) on Policy Envi-
ronment Rankings
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Table 4.12: OLS regression for the Local-Private WD (with Occ.) on Policy Envi-
ronment Rankings
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Table 4.13: OLS regression for the State Health Insurance Differential on Policy
Environment Rankings
95
Table 4.14: OLS regression for the Local Health Insurance Differential on Policy
Environment Rankings
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Table 4.15: Summary of Retirement Pension variables
Table 4.16: OLS regression for the Annual Pension Benefit on Policy Environment
Rankings
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Table 4.17: OLS regression for the Replacement Ratio on Policy Environment Rank-
ings
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Table 4.18: OLS regression for the Underfunding Ratio on Policy Environment Rank-
ings
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Table 4.19: OLS regression for the Underfunding Ratio on ’Right to Work States’
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Chapter 5 Summary
The recent serious economic conditions in the U.S. stimulated debates about public
sector employee compensations. The main issue about these arguments is whether
public sector employees are paid about the same wage or not compare to the private
sector workers. There is much research about wage differential between the public and
private sectors, however, most of them have examined only the wage, and none have
examined the time trend. Therefore I examine wage differential between public sector
employees and private sector employees. Before summarize the finding, it is worth
to mentioning that public sector employees are categorized in three different levels
such as the federal government, state government, and local government according to
where they work for. Each level of public sector workers has different pay and different
fringe benefit systems that are also distinguished from private sector employees. Thus
I estimate wage differential between federal/state/local government employees and the
private sector counterparts, respectively. In addition to wage differential, I estimate
fringe benefit differentials between public and private sector workers. Since fringe
benefits are essential factors when comparing total compensations for workers. For
the analysis of fringe benefit differential, I utilize the probability of receiving employer-
sponsored health insurance and retirement pension plan data which are the two main
components of fringe benefits.
The CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data is used when estimating the wage dif-
ferentials between federal and private sector employees. For the analysis of health
insurance and pension plan benefit differential between federal and private sector em-
ployee, I use March CPS data. Both CPS data include detailed workers’ information
such as wage, demographics, and so on. I use about two decades sample period, from
1995 to 2013, to find the trend of wage differentials. The wage and fringe benefit
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differential estimations between state/local and private sector workers are calculated
based on ACS data from 2012 to 2014. However, retirement pension related data
are not available from ACS. Thus I look for other state-based data on pensions to
capture its generosity. I use data about annual benefits for new retirees and total
retirement income replacement rates for state employees from Biggs et al. (2014).
Also, I collect data on how well-funded the state’s pension system is from Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2009). I use data for all workers whose age is between 18 and 70 year. I
estimate these differentials among full-time1 workers and excluding military workers
and self-employed workers.
The wage differential between federal and private sector employees is estimated
by two different method (OLS and Heckman model) and two different sample (all
occupation workers and only four selected occupation workers). I use OLS regres-
sion method to find basic wage differential. The OLS estimation for federal wage
premium with all workers is between 4.16 percent and 17.14 percent. For the four se-
lected occupations that I examine, the estimates range between 8.8 percent and 16.91
percent. However OLS estimation is unbiased and consistent under the assumption
that choice of being federal government employees is not correlated with disturbance
term. However if they are correlated, due to some unobservable characteristic such as
ability, then the estimation from the OLS can be biased. Thus, I pay careful atten-
tion to the potential bias from unobservables. I explore three general methods, fixed
effects (FE) model, IV approach and the Heckit model, to control for unobservable
characteristics that might cause biased OLS estimations. Since FE model and IV
approach only control for one dimensional unobservable, such as ability, Heckman
selection correction model is used in this research due to its ability to control two di-
mensional unobservables as in a Roy model. The estimation of wage differential from
Heckman model has minimum of 4.76 percent in 1999 and maximum of 17.25 percent
1They work more than 35 hours per week.
104
in 2013 for all employees and between 8.95 percent and 17.23 percent for the only
four selected occupations. These findings suggest that the federal pay differential is
invariably positive, but fell during the 1990s, began to rise in the early 2000s, and
has continued to rise to the end of the sample period.
The estimations for state-private and local-private wage differentials show that
they range widely by state. With wage equations that control for occupations, the
wage differential estimation between the state and the private sector employees are
between -32.4 percent and 18.63 percent. Wyoming state has the largest wage penalty
for state government workers and North Dakota’s state government employees have
the greatest wage premium. The estimation of wage gap of local-private employees
is between -20.64 percent (Mississippi) and 21.43 percent (Idaho). The estimated
wage differential from OLS wage equations without controls for occupation is similar
to previous results. State workers in Nebraska have the highest wage penalty of
40.75 percent and those in North Dakota also have the greatest wage premium of
19.4 percent. The local-private wage differential, without controls for occupation,
is between -25.6 percent (South Dakota) and 21.9 percent (Idaho). Both state and
local government employees’ wage differentials relative to private sector workers vary
widely by state. However, Overall, I find that state government employees earn
7.5 percent and local government employees earn 1.1 percent, on average, less than
private sector counterparts, receptively.
To investigate the fringe benefit differential between federal and private sector em-
ployees, I estimate the probability differential of receiving health employer-sponsored
health insurance and retirement pension plans. Federal workers enjoy a higher prob-
ability of receiving retirement pension plan than private sector counterparts during
entire sample period. It has minimum difference in 2001 as 15.3 percent and maximum
difference in 2011 as 26.6 percent. Probit estimates of the probability of receiving
employer-sponsored health insurance shows a smaller magnitude than pensions and
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not all sample periods show statistically significant differentials. However, since late
2000s, the effect is marginally significant and positive with average 2 percent.
The probabilities of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance in each state
and sectors are estimated and calculate the differences between state/local and pri-
vate sector employees. In contrast to wage differentials, I find that both state and
local government employees have a significantly higher probability of receiving health
insurance through a current employer in all states. The estimations from Idaho for
both state and local probability differential, regarding employer-sponsored health in-
surance provision status, indicate the largest difference with 19.7 percent higher for
state employees and 19.8 percent higher for local employees. Overall, the state gov-
ernment employees received 10.9 percent and the local government employees received
11.2 percent higher probability of receiving health insurance than the private sector,
on average.
Using estimated wage and probability of receiving employer-sponsored health in-
surance differential between state/local government employees as dependent vari-
ables, I investigate the determinants of the differential with state-level data for the
economic policy environment by state. As indices for this, I obtain rankings from
Forbes, ALEC, and the Mercatus Center. These indices rank states on their state
policy. The Forbes ranking is the only index that explains variation in state-private
wage differentials. As the Forbes ranking increases the state private wage gap widens
by 0.32 percent. None of the policy environment indices, however, are statistically
significant in predicting the local-private wage differential. Regarding the determi-
nants of fringe benefit differentials, I use the estimates of the probability differential
of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance and data on retirement pensions.
For the analysis of determinants of probability differential of receiving health insur-
ance through a current employer, the ALEC ranking is the only ranking which is
significant with negative effect. As one ranking increase in the ALEC economic per-
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formance ranking, implying a worse ranking, the probability gap of receiving health
insurance through a current employer is getting narrower. Additionally, I examine
the relationship between these indices and retirement pension related variables such
as state government retirement pension generosity and the degree of soundness in
funding state employees retirement pensions. Among the policy environment indices,
the ALEC ranking is significantly related with the total amount of annual pension
benefit and the ratio of state’s pension underfunding as a percent of tax revenues.
As the ALEC ranking increases by one, implying a worse rankings, annual pension
amount decreases by $ 343.56 and 4.73 percent of annual tax revenue amount is added
as an additional liability to state-sponsored pension plan.
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